University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications of the Center on Children,
Families, and the Law

Children, Families, and the Law, Center on

2009

Protecting Well-Being While Pursuing Justice
Barbara Sturgis
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, bsturgis@ccfl.unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ccflfacpub
Part of the Family Law Commons

Sturgis, Barbara, "Protecting Well-Being While Pursuing Justice" (2009). Faculty Publications of the Center
on Children, Families, and the Law. 1.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ccflfacpub/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Children, Families, and the Law, Center on at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications of the
Center on Children, Families, and the Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska
- Lincoln.

Published (as Chapter 4) in Robert F. Schopp, Richard L. Wiener, Brian H. Bornstein, and Steven L. Willborn. (eds.), Mental Disorder and Criminal Law: Responsibility, Punishment and Competence (NY: Springer, 2009), pp. 103–115; doi 10.1007/978-0-387-84845-7_5, Copyright © 2009
Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. Used by permission.
Chapter 4

Protecting Well-Being While
Pursuing Justice
Barbara J. Sturgis
Center for Children, Families, and the Law
University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, Nebraska, USA
email: bsturgis@ccfl.unl.edu

The second and third chapters in this section draw attention to circumstances in
which concerns regarding the ability of the criminal justice process to achieve just
outcomes intersect with concerns regarding the potential effects of that process
on the psychological well-being of various participants. These chapters by Bruce
Winick, Jodi Quas, and Bradley McAuliff can reasonably be understood as com
plimentary in the following sense. Winick’s chapter endorses a substantive legal
standard and a proposed procedure for applying that standard that raises a series
of questions regarding the manner in which that procedure, and the participants
in that procedure, will be able to fulfill its goals. The chapter by Quas and Mc Auliff emphasizes the extensive body of empirical research addressing the effects of
the criminal justice process on participating children in an attempt to promote the
development of processes that will protect the well-being of those children while
promoting just outcomes.

4.1 Serious Mental Illness and Capital Punishment
In his chapter on determining when severe mental illness should disqualify a defen
dant from capital punishment, Winick writes that those with severe mental illness
(SMI) at the time of the offense should be afforded the same categorical preclusion
from capital punishment as those with mental retardation (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002)
and as juveniles (Roper v. Simmons, 2005). Both those with mental retardation
and juveniles were found to be categorically less culpable and therefore less appro
priate for capital punishment. He endorses the approach favored by the American
Bar Association (ABA), American Psychological Association (APA), American Psychiatric Association (APA), and National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI), that
103
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there should be an exemption from capital punishment only for those with SMI
who suffer significant impairment of their capacity to: (1) appreciate the nature,
consequences, or wrongfulness of their conduct; (2) exercise rational judgment in
relation to their conduct; or (3) conform their conduct to the requirements of law
(Winick, 2009, this volume, p. 45) He outlines a number of procedural changes that
could occur if such a categorical bar were in place, and he maintains that these pro
cedural changes would positively impact not only the defendant, but also possibly
the family of the victim and various other actors in the legal system.
For the purposes of this discussion, assume that there is a subset of offenders with SMI who do not qualify as not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), who
manifest the above impairments, who are arguably less culpable than unimpaired
offenders, and who probably should not face the death penalty. The question becomes how to determine who these people are, and what procedures should apply to them. Throughout the chapter, Winick relies heavily on laws and cases
involving mental retardation, making the case that what applies to those with
mental retardation applies to those with SMI who have the requisite “impaired
capacities.” While many of those with mental retardation and SMI share some
similarities, there are many important differences between these two diagnostic
categories. Both mental retardation and SMI cause significant impairment in individuals’ functioning. The description of “impaired capacities” outlined above
could certainly apply to those with mental retardation and some of those with
SMI. However, there are crucial differences between these two categories of psychological impairment that raise important questions regarding the reliability of
retrospective assessment of SMI in a relatively limited pretrial hearing.
First, mental retardation, at its various levels, is a specific diagnosis whereas
SMI is not. Mental retardation has a specific description and agreed-upon criteria within the lexicon of mental disorders (DSM-IV, 1994). Although the precise
measure of mental retardation that would constitute a barrier to capital punishment may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the category and its levels are
well defined and well accepted within the mental health community. Under Winick’s proposal, SMI would become a legal definition that would remain undefined
clinically, and therefore would be left to courts or legislatures to determine. SMI
could cover a multitude of diagnostic categories and would likely vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Probably the most common perception of
SMI would include schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. Those diagnoses would comport with the public’s perception of what mental illness is. However, those with cognitive impairments, such as dementia and delirium, could
qualify as well as those with severe mood disorders. SMI could also be descriptive of those with the serious dissociative disorders (such as dissociative identity
disorder) and even in some with severe personality disorders (such as borderline
personality disorder). Therefore, a good deal of the DSM-IV could be captured by
potential legal descriptions of SMI.
Another concern raised by the differences between mental retardation and men
tal illness is that, by definition, mental retardation is a global impairment of cog
nitive capacities. When an individual is diagnosed with mental retardation, while
there may be some variation within their limitations, they have significant deficits
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in all areas of cognitive functioning. If there is a deficit only in a specific area of cognitive functioning, that would more likely be defined as a specific learning disability. Therefore, a diagnosis of mental retardation would be an accurate and consistent prediction of a person’s functional impairment in virtually all situations.
On the other hand, individuals who carry diagnoses potentially covered by
the descriptor SMI can be fairly functional in some, and perhaps many areas,
and they can be significantly impaired in other areas. For example, an individual might experience paranoid delusions about aliens who are trying to poison
him and make him ill, but he might remain competent and confident in handling
his financial obligations. He then could be severely impaired in managing his diet
(only green canned vegetables) and in dealing with medical professionals (the
aliens in disguise who are trying to kill him). He would not necessarily be impaired in dealing with his banker and paying his bills. Should an individual be
severely impaired in a manner that profoundly affects all aspects of his life, it is
hard to understand why he should not be found to be NGRI.
Not only is mental retardation a specific diagnostic category within the DSMIV, it also has well-established and standardized methods of assessment. Evaluating an individual for mental retardation is a relatively straightforward procedure. It requires the standardized administration of an individual intellectual
test, an assessment of adaptive functioning, and a review of the individual’s developmental history. The intelligence test assesses the individual’s performance
on a number of standardized tasks that have been normed on a standardized
population. At the level of mental retardation that would be at issue for any legal proceedings there are one or two commonly used standardized tests. Assessment of adaptive functioning, by report of the individual and those who interact with him or her, looks at practical functioning in a wide array of daily tasks.
The history determines the etiology of the retardation, including early developmental history and any events that may have affected the individual’s functioning and development. An assessment and diagnosis of mental retardation can be
done without any knowledge of the individual’s criminal activity. It would only
be at the upper levels of mental retardation (mild) that an individual would likely
meet the requirements of criminal responsibility. Those at lower levels of functioning would be likely to be found not guilty by reason of mental defect and also
incompetent to stand trial. In a sense, measuring intellectual functioning is much
more of an actuarial process, although it does involve some clinical judgment.
While there are various assessment instruments which aid in the evaluation of
those with mental illness, such assessments rely much more heavily on clinical
judgment than do assessments of metal retardation. There is no single standard
ized method of assessing SMI, since it is not a clinical diagnosis. There are no
tests comparable to intelligence test in that they are conventionally accepted as
determining an individual’s psychological condition as SMI. Therefore the deter
mination of SMI is much more fluid and open to interpretation. This would be
especially true at the level where the individual is not NGRI but would still be under consideration for preclusion from capital punishment. Presumably, if someone is so severely impaired that it is clear to all, it is much more likely that he or
she would be found NGRI.
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Along with the fact that the symptoms of SMI vary significantly within
individuals and between individuals in the same diagnostic categories, many
symptoms of SMI can be ameliorated by medication. In the area of schizophrenic
and psychotic disorders there is a vast array of antipsychotic medications which,
for many individuals afflicted with psychoses, can reduce the more florid and
disturbing symptoms. While it is difficult to completely eliminate delusional
thinking, it can be reduced to a significantly more controllable level. Many antipsychotic medications can also reduce or even eliminate hallucinatory experiences. Therefore, understanding an individual’s functioning at any given time
would have to take into account whether he or she were medicated and the impact of medication at the time of the offense. That raises the concern that a person
might qualify as SMI at one point in time, and, with proper medication controlling symptoms, not qualify as SMI at some other time, while carrying the same
diagnosis. Thus, establishing that an offender manifests SMI at a particular time
before or after an offense does not clearly establish that he or she suffered SMI at
the time of the offense. In contrast, there are no medications that can directly improve functioning in an individual with mental retardation. There may be some
medications that can improve ancillary functioning, such as medications to reduce anxiety or improve focus, but there are none that can increase intellectual
functioning overall. Thus, the severity of mental retardation remains consistent
over time, rendering it less difficult to retrospectively establish the severity of impairment at the time of the offense.
Therefore, a psychological assessment of an individual that would be of assis
tance to the court to determine whether or not he or she fits one of the diagnostic
categories that would likely be included in the category of SMI would necessitate a
thorough understanding of the legal standard in the particular jurisdiction and of
the relationship between that standard and clinical diagnoses. For example, is anyone who carries the diagnosis of schizophrenia considered SMI or just those with
serious symptoms? Is the individual not SMI at some points, as when properly
medicated with symptoms well controlled, but SMI at others, when off medication
and experiencing more florid symptoms? Because the recommended rule emphasizes the individual’s behavior “at the time of the offense,” any assessment would
have to take into account the individual’s psychological impairment at that time.
This proposal further narrows the category to be precluded from capital pun
ishment to those with SMI who have a significant impairment in their capacity to
appreciate the nature and consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, to exercise rational judgment in relation to their conduct, or to conform their conduct to
the requirements of the law (Winick, 2009, this volume, p. 45). Therefore, any assessment relevant to the legal questions would have to take into consideration the
particular conduct and understanding of the law that the person had at the time
of the crime. The assessment would involve a thorough understanding of the indi
vidual’s psychological impairment at the time of the crime, the details of the crime
itself, and the relationship between the two. That assessment would necessitate the
defendant conceding the facts of the crime and a description of his/her thinking/
belief at the time. For example, if our paranoid individual in the above example
stabbed and killed the nurse who was giving him his flu shot because he believed
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she was an alien trying to kill him, he might fit the definition of SMI and “significant impairment” for the purposes of preclusion from capital punishment. However, if that same schizophrenic individual, properly medicated, stabbed the nurse
because she made him wait too long in line and he was angry, he might not be
sufficiently impaired to qualify as SMI for the purposes of preclusion from capital
punishment. Nor would he be if he shot a teller while attempting to rob the drive
up window at his bank because he wanted more money. Knowledge of the crime
and the thinking/ belief at the time would not be necessary for the assessment of
mental retardation, which can be done absent any knowledge of the crime itself.
For that reason, a pretrial hearing, although focusing on the defendant’s mental
illness, would be much more involved than one making a determination of mental retardation. It would still necessitate a thorough airing of the “gruesome facts
of the crime” in order to determine the relationship between the defendant’s impaired processes and the criminal conduct. The psychologist would have to know
exactly what happened and what the defendant was thinking at the time to evaluate the relationship between any diagnostic category and the crime. Since the determination of both SMI and “impaired processes” are legal decisions the judge
would also have to know the details of the crime to make that judgment. That
raises the question of what sources for the facts of the crime would be allowed.
For example, would the psychologist or judge rely only on the information provided by the defendant or would he/she get the crime scene photos? None of this
is necessary in a case involving mental retardation in which the judge only needs
to decide which psychological evaluation to accept.
Given the complexity of determining that an exemption from capital punishment is warranted for some individuals with SMI, Winick’s proposal that
such hearings be done by judges rather than juries makes sense. The judge
would have to first determine whether the individual was SMI at the time of
the crime and the effect of that SMI on the criminal behavior. Given the potential for fluctuation in functioning within individuals with a history of SMI, it
would be quite possible that a person who appears relatively intact at the time
of the hearing was quite impaired at the time of the crime. Furthermore, determination of whether the requisite “significant impairments” occurred at the
time of the crime requires a nuanced analysis of what qualifies as “significant
impairments,” how those impairments impacted the individual’s behavior, and
whether they rose to the level that would preclude capital punishment. Judges
have a greater understanding of the law and are “probably more due process
oriented than capital juries” (Winick, 2009, this volume, p.). Judges would likely
have more exposure to cases in which SMI plays a part, either for NGRI or in
other exemption hearings. They would therefore have a wider experiential base
with which to compare the extant case to others, as well as more experience
with evaluating expert testimony. This recommendation is consistent with David Baldus’ research into judicial versus jury sentencing in capital cases (Baldus,
Woodworth, Grosso, & Christ, 2002). He found support for greater consistency
in judicial sentencing compared to jury sentencing (Baldus et. al., 2002, p.669).
Preclusion of an individual with SMI and the requisite impairments would be
potentially more complex than capital sentencing and require more legal un-
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derstanding and more sophistication with regard to mental health issues than
would be found in most juries.
Winick also raises considerations with respect to Therapeutic Jurisprudence
the intentional and unintentional psychological impact of the law on the well-being of the people involved (Wexler & Schopp, 1992). His contention is that having
the issue of preclusion from capital punishment decided pretrial would significantly reduce the stress on those involved in the process. It seems reasonable that
if the defendant were found not eligible for capital punishment in a pretrial hearing, there would be significantly less stress for those involved in the guilt and
penalty phases of the actual trial. They would not face the possibility that the defendant might eventually be put to death as a result of their decisions. He noted
that there would likely be less intense scrutiny on the judge in a non-capital trial
as well as less potential distress for the jury. The same could hold true for the
attorneys. There is a question regarding the feelings of the family of the victim.
While some may feel relief at having the death penalty off the table and therefore
the potential of more timely closure, others may feel cheated out of the retribution they feel is deserved.
Although those involved in the pretrial hearing would be making decisions
that could place the defendant in the position of being eligible for capital punishment, it is reasonable to expect that the stress would still be less than the stress
of a capital sentencing hearing since they would be insulated from the final outcome by the guilt and penalty phases of the actual trial. The judge (or jury) would
know that even if the defendant was found eligible for capital punishment, several more legal proceedings intervene prior to his or her facing death. While Winick did not mention the psychologist, it would also seem reasonable to expect
that participating in a pretrial determination of eligibility for capital punishment
would be less stressful than relevant evaluations further along the process, such
as an evaluation of competency to face execution. Presiding at a pretrial hearing
might be quite stressful for the judge, however, in that he or she may face even
more intense scrutiny as the sole decision-maker regarding whether the defendant would ultimately face capital sentencing.
Throughout the paper, Winick focuses on the blessings that would occur if
an individual with SMI and the requisite impairments could be precluded from
capital punishment in a pretrial judicial hearing. He does not discuss the impact
of such a process when the defendant is found eligible for capital punishment.
All of the Therapeutic Jurisprudence advantages would vanish. The stressors on
the individuals involved in a capital trial would still be present, along with the
added strain of the rather complex pretrial hearing itself, almost the trial before
the trial. Winick was also concerned about the “lens” through which a capitalqualified jury views the evidence in a capital trial. If the use of a pretrial hearing
to determine eligibility for capital punishment were commonly understood, and
the defendant were found to be eligible, jurors would potentially have another
“lens” through which to view the defendant and the evidence. First, the defendant would have conceded the details of the crime for the purposes of the pretrial
hearing. Would this increase the likelihood of a guilty verdict at trial? Second, a
judge has decided that the defendant was sane enough to face the possibility of

Protecting Well-Being While Pursuing Justice

109

the death penalty. The jury might assume that the sanity issue has been settled
and no longer needs to be considered. This might, for example, have a significant
effect on a jury’s willingness to consider mental illness, or even SMI, as a mitigator during the penalty phase.
Another question arises regarding how this pretrial process would work in
conjunction with a potential plea of NGRI. Since the issue of NGRI is handled at
trial, would the defendant have to pursue a pretrial hearing to determine if he/
she is eligible for capital punishment and then present the NGRI defense at trial,
or would a pretrial determination of eligibility effectively preclude an NGRI defense, although it technically should not? Insofar as the defendant must pursue
each claim in separate phases, would the pretrial process regarding SMI contaminate the accurate evaluation of the NGRI defense during the trial? Alternately,
would the desire to pursue a NGRI defense lead the defendant to make a strategic decision to forgo the pretrial SMI hearing in circumstances in which it should
be addressed?
It seems likely that there is a subset of defendants who, while not NGRI, are
sufficiently impaired because of SMI to be less culpable and not deserving of the
death penalty. The question becomes how to accurately identify these people, and
what procedures should be used to ensure fairness. The process endorsed by Win
ick has the potential to be extremely complex and vary widely from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. For some participants in these procedures, the pretrial determination might reduce the psychological stress without undermining other important considerations, such as the accuracy of the determinations and comparative
justice. The potential length and complexity of such hearings suggests, however,
that they might inflict substantial stress on some participants under some circumstances. Alternatively, attempts to reduce the length or complexity of such hearings might undermine attempts to attain comparative or non-comparative justice.
Thus, an attempt to design and implement such hearings in a manner that ameliorates harm to the psychological well-being of the participants will require an extended inquiry regarding a complex set of empirical and justificatory questions.
The third chapter in this section discusses a related set of empirical studies that
are relevant to a different category of criminal proceedings.

4.2 Protecting Child Victim Witnesses
Quas and McAuliff present information on children’s involvement in the criminal
justice system. They emphasize both the necessity of having children in court and
also the potential impact of that participation on children’s well-being. They pres
ent data on the kinds of stressors that can occur when children are involved in legal procedures and the kinds of accommodations that might be made to mitigate
those stressors. Some of those stressors include lack of legal knowledge, repeated
interviews especially by different people whom the children do not know, testi
fying, facing the perpetrator in court, case length, and case outcome. Relatively
non-controversial interventions that have addressed some of these stressors include providing information about the legal process to child witnesses, coordi-
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nating investigations through the use of child advocacy centers (CACs), and providing support persons. Other, more controversial changes to procedures, have
included the use of videotaped testimony and testimony outside the courtroom
via closed circuit television.
Quas and McAuliff refer in particular to data about child victims of sexual abuse
who become witnesses since much of the research on children’s involvement as
witnesses in both the criminal and juvenile systems has been done with this population. They note that there are many factors common to child sexual abuse cases
that are also common in other kinds of criminal cases. These include case length,
repeated interviews, testifying, and case outcomes. However, there are important factors central to sexual abuse cases that may not be found in other situations
where children might testify. Primary among them is that most children who testify in sexual abuse cases are the victims. Most often, they have a prior relationship with the perpetrator who uses that relationship to involve the child in sexual activity. Since children rarely disclose sexual abuse immediately (if ever) the
abuse has often continued over a significant period of time (Lyon, 2007; Roesler &
Wind, 1994). Because of these factors and the sexual nature of the crime, child victim/witnesses commonly experience lasting feelings of responsibility, shame, embarrassment, and guilt (Sgroi, 1982; Roesler & Wind, 1994). They often feel guilty
for the abuse itself, for the disruption caused by the disclosure, and for the consequences to the perpetrator whom the child may care about. Also, it is not uncommon for them to risk relationships with other family members by virtue of the disclosure. Therefore, child sexual abuse cases, while likely being the most common
situation in which children testify, and while providing most of the available data
on the impact of legal proceedings on children, present additional stressors that
may not be present in other types of cases where children might testify.
Regarding the consequences of legal involvement on children, Quas and McAuliff enumerate a number of areas that may cause stress or trauma for children. The
first area they discuss is legal understanding. They note that children are limited in
both general legal knowledge and also about the specifics of their case. The question becomes how this lack of knowledge impacts both children’s ability to participate fully as witnesses and the level of distress that they feel. Children who
are maltreated often feel partly responsible for the maltreatment and may assume
that the legal involvement signifies that they are in trouble or that they are causing
trouble for others. Children who are fearful that they are in trouble may disclose
less information and experience more confusion and stress during the process. Because providing children with information regarding legal proceedings would not
negatively impact those proceedings, it would appear to be a straightforward way
to enhance children’s participation and potentially reduce stress.
Children need information both about how the court system works in general
and about the specifics of their case. This may reduce their level of anxiety and
contribute to the perception that the process is fair (Melton et al., 1992). Research
efforts might refine our understanding of the kinds of legal information that are
important to children of particular age groups, the best method for delivery, and
how to assess whether children truly understand the information they need. For
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example, there has been significant research in the medical field on the utility of
preparing children prior to medical procedures (Cardona, 1994). Some of those
studies have looked at parents providing the information and the use of videotapes of children explaining the procedures to children, which the children have
found helpful in reducing their anxiety and in helping them cope with the procedure itself (Pinto & Hollandsworth, 1989). As with adults, keeping children informed regarding the specifics of their case and why things take as long as they
do is important. Children’s perception of time is different from adults’ sense of
how long things take. It is also harder for especially young children to keep track
of the passage of events. Therefore, they need more support and ongoing information to understand the status of their case.
Another potential source of stress that Quas and McAuliff review is the impact of repeated interviews on children. Certainly, at the investigative stage,
there is significant concern regarding the impact of repeated interviews on children (Poole & Lamb, 1998; Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Olafson, 2007). This concern
stems from the need for accuracy and from sensitivity to the impact of the process on children. The modifications in the investigative process that have been
recommended, including minimizing unnecessary multiple interviews and the
use of child advocacy centers, reflect the recognition that repeated questioning of
children has the potential for affecting the quality of information as well as the
child’s experience (Faller, 2007). Although children report that the experience of
multiple interviews is negative (Tedesco & Schnell, 1987; Quas et al., 2005), research efforts might focus on the impact of such interviews when they have been
conducted in a child friendly, developmentally appropriate manner. It can be
quite a relief for children to finally talk about ongoing abuse, a burden they often bear in secret. Also, children are fairly flexible when the reasons for adult actions are explained. Thus, if repeated interviews are necessary to gather or clarify relevant information, or to prepare for court, children might be able to handle
them fairly well if they are done appropriately, the reason is explained, and the
children understand the process.
Quas and McAuliff note that testifying appears to be the most stressful act of
legal involvement for children. Testifying is difficult for both children and adults.
A major source of stress for children in the courtroom is having to face the defen
dant. Facing the perpetrator—in sexual abuse cases it is most likely someone with
whom the child has had a trusted relationship—is what children say is the most
stressful part of being in court (Goodman et al., 1992). When children don’t understand the protections that are in place, they may fear that the perpetrator may
be able to approach them in the courtroom. Even when children recognize that
they are physically safe in the courtroom, they worry about what the perpetrator
may be able to do to them outside of court, which in some cases is not unrealistic.
Since most of the child victim/witnesses who have been studied have been in extended abusive relationships with the perpetrator, they often continue to feel vulnerable and anxious even when their physical safety is assured. Aside from fear
(realistic and unrealistic), child victim/witnesses often feel guilty about testifying
against a parent, relative, or friend. Also, they are embarrassed about having to
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talk about sexual matters in open court. Again, many of these factors are unique
to the population most often studied.
Children are anxious about facing the perpetrator, even in therapeutic settings.
However, particularly in sexual abuse cases, facing the perpetrator and express
ing their distress about what happened to them is an important part of the healing process for victims. This process acknowledges the reality of the abuse and
who is responsible for it. It is especially important that the non-offending parent, usually the mother, acknowledges the reality of the abuse, condemns it, and
is supportive of the victim. When the perpetrator takes responsibility for his behavior and, hopefully, apologizes, it is even more therapeutic for the victim. That
raises the question of whether or how testifying in court can attain some of these
same therapeutic gains. It is possible that testifying in open court could be a way
for the child to openly declare the reality of the experiences that they have had.
It is also a way for adults to listen to and take seriously what the child has to say,
with a very formalized procedure. Grown-ups are listening carefully to the child
and asking questions to understand better. Even cross examination, which can be
confusing for both adults and children, is an acknowledgment of what the child
has said. If children can be taught how to manage difficult cross examination, that
further validates what they have to say. Research that informs our ability to create procedures that support the child’s ability to respond adaptively to cross examination would enhance the children’s well-being and their ability to contribute
to an effective process of adjudication.
A related issue that Quas and McAuliff note is the manner and question type
used in cross examination. A major focus of training for those who investigate
child abuse and child sexual abuse is how to talk to children in a developmentally appropriate, non-leading manner (Poole & Lamb, 1998). Cross-examination,
if anything, is often the opposite. Questions can be confusing and highly suggestive. The language is often inappropriate for the child’s age and experience.
As they point out, these kinds of questions are often difficult for adults and beyond the ability of children to comprehend. Accommodations are already made
for individuals who are deaf and for those who do not speak English. It might be
worth studying what kinds of courtroom linguistic accommodations would promote the ability of children to testify as accurately and completely as possible.
Presumably, such accommodations would also reduce confusion and therefore
distress for those children. Professionals who provide expert testimony often pursue extensive training in preparing to testify effectively. Perhaps some analogous
form of training would assist many children in increasing their level of accuracy
and in reducing the amount of distress they experience.
One of the factors that impacts how well children react to testifying appears to
be maternal support. Children who do not receive maternal support during legal
proceedings function significantly more poorly over time (Goodman et al., 1992).
Similarly, children who receive maternal support are likely to disclose sexual abuse
earlier and experience less distress (Elliott & Briere, 1994; London, Bruck, Ceci, &
Shuman, 2005; Olafson & Lederman, 2006; Shaw, Lewis, Loeb, Rosado, & Rodriguez, 2001). Previous research has found that children’s perceptions of the legal
process may very well be mediated by the perceptions of their caretakers (Good-
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man et al., 1992). Thus, it is possible that some of the anxiety that children feel about
testifying and their negative feelings about the process may be a reflection of what
they are hearing from their parents or sensing about their parents’ emotions. Although much consideration has focused on what to do for children directly, both
during the investigative and testimony phase, it appears that a significant mitigator
of distress throughout the legal process is the presence of a supportive adult, most
usually the mother in child sexual abuse cases. Therefore, another important avenue for supporting children in legal settings should focus on the role of the parent
or adult support person and on identifying the kinds of interventions that would
enhance their effectiveness with the children. If parents are less anxious, if they
thoroughly understand the legal process, and if they feel the process is fair, their attitudes will likely influence their children’s perceptions. This would be particularly
true for the youngest and therefore most vulnerable children.
Possible ways of preventing children from experiencing the stress of testifying
in open court include the use of videotaped testimony or closed circuit television.
Quas and McAuliff outline the research in this area and note that these accommodations, while possibly reducing the stress on children, remain highly controversial because they require significant modification of trial court proceedings and
may impinge upon the right of the defendant to cross-examine the child. These
rarely used modifications to courtroom procedures, while reducing immediate
stress, may have longer term unintended consequences for children. As noted,
children most often testify because they have been abused, most frequently in
the form of sexual abuse. However, with any abuse, children typically feel guilty
about what has happened to them. The abuse is usually kept secret which, aggravates its psychological effect on the child. The use of videotaped testimony
which keeps the child out of court may eliminate the stress of the child having
to appear in court, but may perpetuate the sense that what has happened to the
child should be kept secret because it is shameful. The same concerns are relevant to the use of closed-circuit television to allow children to testify outside the
open courtroom. It may reinforce the notion that children need to hide from both
the perpetrator and the embarrassment of what has happened to them. Being able
to testify in open court about what has happened to them may have the potential to be therapeutic for some children. In the studies from other countries that
compared closed-circuit testimony with open court testimony, were the children
who testified in open court properly prepared to do so? The degree and quality
of preparation might substantially influence the relative stressfulness of testifying
via closed-circuit television and of testifying in open court.
In their conclusion, Quas and McAuliff reference therapeutic jurisprudence
and recognize that law is a social force that can bring about therapeutic or
antitherapeutic outcomes for those involved. They note that we cannot eliminate
all stress for children who participate in legal procedures. We should question,
however, whether we should want to eliminate all stress. It is important in reflecting upon this question and this literature that we distinguish between stress and
trauma. Often when we look at information on the impact of court procedures
on children, stress and trauma seem to be used interchangeably. The mere fact
that something creates anxiety or stress does not mean that it will cause trauma.

114

B. J. Sturgis

in

Mental Disorder

and

C r i m i n a l L a w (2009)

Trauma “is an emotional wound or shock that creates substantial, lasting damage to the psychological development of a person, …” (American Heritage, 2000).
When individuals face stressful situations and are able master them, such experiences have the potential to increase coping skills and a sense of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986). Therefore, we should ask whether the stress of legal procedures, specifically testifying, is necessarily bad for children if they have the proper tools
with which to manage that stress? We should certainly modify those aspects of
legal proceedings that cause unnecessary stress, such as unnecessary repeat interviews, lack of knowledge, and other sources of such unnecessary stress. However, children might be best served by teaching them how to cope with the distress and difficulties involved in dealing with the court process. Children also
might be well served by educating their caretakers about how to cope with their
child’s stress and with their own. Therefore, assisting the children and their caretakers in managing the stress of testifying may substantially influence the longterm effects of participation in the legal process.
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